Recent methodological innovation is giving rise to an increasing number of applied papers in medical and epidemiological journals in which natural direct and indirect effects are estimated. However, there is a longstanding debate on whether such effects are relevant targets of inference in population health. In light of the repeated calls for a more pragmatic and consequential epidemiology, we review three issues often raised in this debate: (i) the use of composite cross-world counterfactuals and the need for cross-world independence assumptions; (ii) interventional vs non-interventional identifiability; and (iii) the interpretational ambiguity of natural direct and indirect effect estimates. We use potential outcomes notation and directed acyclic graphs to explain 'cross-world' assumptions, illustrate implications of this assumption via regression models and discuss ensuing issues of interpretation. We argue that the debate on the relevance of natural direct and indirect effects rests on whether one takes as a target of inference the mathematical object per se, or the change in the world that the mathematical object represents. We further note that public health questions may be better served by estimating controlled direct effects.
Introduction
In the past decade, the analysis of direct and indirect exposure effects has benefited from a flurry of intellectual activity and insight. Building on the social sciences literature of the early to mid 1980s, 1, 2 an extensive body of work is devoted to formalizing effect decomposition under a range of conditions. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] This work has given rise to an increasing number of applied papers in medical and epidemiological journals in which causal mediation analysis is used to decompose effects. [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] The effects estimated in these applications can be described with reference to the directed acyclic graph (DAG) in Figure 1 , where the direct effect of the exposure X is the portion of the effect transmitted through the path X ! Y, and the indirect effect through X ! M ! Y. Two broad types of effects are commonly used in mediation analysis. The first are controlled direct effects, which quantify the exposure effect under an intervention that sets the mediator to a specific value for all individuals in the population. Controlled indirect effects are notably difficult to conceptualize, and instead are defined as some contrast between the total and controlled direct effects in the absence of exposure-mediator interactions. 15 The second type of direct effects are 'natural' (or 'pure') direct effects, which are meant to estimate the exposure effect that would be observed holding the mediator fixed at the value it would have taken under some referent exposure value. Similarly, natural indirect effects seek to estimate the effect the exposure has through the mediator by changing the mediator from the value it would have taken under some referent exposure to the value it would have taken under some specific alternate exposure (all while holding the exposure fixed). In all cases (controlled direct, natural direct and natural indirect effects), the causal effect of interest is defined as a contrast of potential outcomes, or a contrast of outcomes that would be observed under different (possibly counter to fact) exposure and mediator values.
As practitioners of the science of public health, it has long been argued that epidemiologists should seek to estimate parameters that have a logical correspondence with some realistic intervention that might be taken to improve population health. [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] Similarly, in causal inference, the idea that one cannot estimate causal effects without some clearly defined (possibly hypothetical) exposure intervention is widespread. 28, [32] [33] [34] [35] This perspective has, for some time now, fuelled a debate on the usefulness of decomposing effects into their natural direct and indirect components. Some 3, 5, 36 have argued that because natural direct and indirect effects cannot be identified using intervention-based causal models, and cannot be estimated in a randomized trial, they cannot be interpreted as effects that have a logical correspondence with some public health action or policy. 36, 39, 45, 46 on the interpretation of natural direct and indirect effects. We highlight three related issues that obfuscate their interpretation: (i) the use of composite cross-world counterfactuals and the need for cross-world independence assumptions; (ii) interventional vs noninterventional identifiability; and (iii) the ambiguous policy implications of natural direct and indirect effect estimates. We start by defining relevant terms, and review the assumptions needed to identify natural direct and indirect effects that render them difficult to interpret. We consider regression models for natural direct and indirect effects to illustrate why they cannot be identified via actual interventions. We discuss ensuing issues of scientific falsifiability and interpretation, and argue that the debate on the relevance of natural direct and indirect effects rests on whether one takes as a target of inference the mathematical object per se, or the change in the world that the mathematical object is meant to represent. confounders. Natural direct and indirect effects can be consistently estimated upon adjusting for C XY , C XM and C MY . Note that there is no arrow from X to C MY in which case natural direct and indirect effects cannot be identified.
Natural direct and indirect effects
Conceptually, the natural indirect effect is the expected change in the outcome when the mediator changes as though the exposure had (but when, in actuality, the exposure hadn't) changed. 44 Similarly, the natural direct effect is the expected change in the outcome if we were to 'freeze' the mediator value for each person at the level it would have taken had the person's exposure been some referent level (but when, in actuality, the person's exposure status changes). 44 To formalize these concepts, we use potential outcomes. 32 Throughout, we let capital letters denote random variables, and lower-case letters denote possible realizations. We let X denote exposure, M denote mediator, Y denote outcome and C : {C XY , C XM , C MY } denote confounders of the exposure-outcome, exposuremediator and mediator-outcome relations, respectively. We start with a hypothetical study in which we collect information on n individuals. For each individual indexed by
] denote the outcome we would have observed for individual i had she been exposed to X i ¼ x, with a mediator status defined as M i (x). Importantly, the potential outcome
is itself a function of another potential outcome M i (x): the mediator value that would have been observed under
] is a composite counterfactual, 47 a basic element needed to define natural direct and indirect effects. For instance, the difference in means for the natural direct effect of X on Y, independent of the effect of X on M, is:
where the expectation E f g is taken over individuals i, x and x* represent some assigned and referent exposure values, and Y[x, M(x*)] represents the potential outcome that would have been observed under X ¼ x and under the potential mediator value that would have been observed under X ¼ x*. Such composite counterfactuals are the first problem with natural direct and indirect effects. Estimating them requires a union of two logically incompatible states: the outcome under exposure x with the mediator set to what it would have been under x*. Because no single individual can ever exist with exposure values x and x*, this composite counterfactual requires information that can only exist in two separate 'worlds', and has thus been referred to as a 'cross-world' counterfactual. 46 It is worth emphasizing the unique status of the crossworld counterfactual in light of the more typical contrasts estimated in causal inference. That a single individual can never be observed in both exposed and unexposed states is known as the fundamental problem of causal inference. 32 Decades of work has been devoted to formalizing how different methods (e.g. standard regression, marginal structural models) can be used to impute summary measures (e.g. means, hazards, odds) of missing potential outcomes under an unobserved exposure state. [48] [49] [50] However, natural direct and indirect effects go beyond this by requiring that one impute information on the potential outcome that would have been observed under the union of two logically incompatible exposure states.
Identifiability assumptions
Every mediation analysis requires that a set of unverifiable assumptions be met. [3] [4] [5] [6] 45, 51, 52 These assumptions can be depicted using the directed acyclic graph (DAG) in Figure 1 , which shows that, conditional on C ¼ {C XM , C XY , C MY }, there must be:
i. no uncontrolled exposure-outcome confounding ii. no uncontrolled mediator-outcome confounding iii. no uncontrolled exposure-mediator confounding iv. no measured or unmeasured effect of the exposure that confounds the mediator outcome relation.
Identifying controlled direct effects requires that assumptions (i) and (ii) be met. Identifying natural direct and indirect effects entails the addition of assumptions (iii) and (iv). In words, assumption (iv) requires that, conditional on C MY , the mediator that would have been observed in a world where X ¼ x* is independent of the outcome that would have been observed in a world where X ¼ x. This assumption is known as a cross-world independence assumption. 46 Because this assumption can never be tested in an empirical setting, 44 a number of authors have raised concerns about the interpretation of natural direct and indirect effect estimates. 43, 46, 53 Others have developed alternate conditions under which natural direct and indirect effects can be identified. 51, 54 All of them, however, require independence between some function of the potential mediator M(x*) and some function of the potential outcome Y [x, M(x)]. Using DAGs, assumption (iv) leads to the idea of the 'recanting witness'. This name arose because of the fact that the exposure variable 'tries to have it both ways'. 45 Along the path in Figure 1 defined by X ! M ! Y, the exposure behaves as though it exists in some exposed state X ¼ x. However, along the path defined by X ! Y, the same exposure 'changes the story' and behaves as though it exists in some unexposed referent state X ¼ x*. 45, 55 The implications of this recantation are nebulous from an epidemiological perspective. How might one interpret an effect estimate in which the exposure X can behave as a realization x along one causal path, but a different realization x* along another causal path? Although interpreting natural direct and indirect effects may be difficult, methods have been proposed to estimate these effects. For example, one approach 6 combines separate regression models for the outcome and mediator:
Parameters from these models are combined to obtain the natural direct effect, defined as:
When the above expression is factored out, it yields a term h 3 c 1 x Ã x that immediately reveals the cross-world nature of the natural direct effect, akin to an interaction between the exposure at its reference value in one world ðx Ã Þ, and the exposure at its exposed value in another world ðxÞ. The same scenario plays out for the natural indirect effect as well. This and other methods to estimate natural direct and indirect effects ignore the philosophical problem of estimating quantities that require such cross-world interactions, and replace them with much more tractable mathematical problems of estimation. 47 Estimating these quantities raises concern as to whether they are no more than mathematical constructs, without meaningful correspondence to the world. 35 Further still is the added problem that we can only ask (and answer) such questions absent any empirical evidence in support or against our beliefs about the meaning of such quantities. Such beliefs can never be confirmed or refuted using empirical data because natural direct and indirect effects cannot be estimated via randomized intervention trials. 3, 44, 46 Policy relevance An additional issue is the disconnect that exists between natural direct and indirect effects and policy. Suppose we are interested in estimating the mediating role of screening mammography in the relation between hormone replacement therapy and breast cancer. As pointed out in Joffe et al., 56 women taking hormone replacement therapy are under more medical supervision, and thus subject to more mammographic screening. As a result, more breast cancer is observed among women taking hormone replacement therapy, and some portion of the excess cases is due to this increased detection. But how much? At face value, natural direct and indirect effects may seem worthwhile to pursue in this setting. A natural indirect effect risk ratio of 0.2 would tell us that the breast cancer risk under the mammographic screening that a woman would have had under postmenopausal hormone therapy is one-fifth the risk of breast cancer under the mammographic screening that a woman would have had under no postmenopausal hormone therapy. Whereas one can implement clinical or public health policy decisions to perform mammography for some well-defined set of women, there is no way to define an intervention that results in unexposed women undergoinging the mammography screening that they would have undergone had they been exposed to postmenopausal hormone therapy (and vice versa). Thus, natural effects cannot be used as a basis for policy, whether individual, clinical or population-level. Such an approach to epidemiological inference stands at odds with the consistently emphasized raison d'etre of our field: to intervene, to change elements of the world and to improve the population's health.
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Discussion
In this paper, we have highlighted the salient issues in the longstanding debate on the relevance of natural direct and indirect effects. We reviewed a number of characteristics of natural direct and indirect effects that often receive little or no attention in the epidemiological literature. Natural direct and indirect effects: (i) require a union of states that can never occur together in the world (states that are logically incompatible); (ii) require independence assumptions to hold between these logically incompatible states; and (iii) can never be interpreted so as to inform individual, clinical or public health interventions. This last condition we believe markedly curtails the usefulness of natural direct and indirect effects, especially in light of the extensive history of calls for pragmatic epidemiological research. The debate on the relevance of natural direct and indirect effects in epidemiology has been going on for some time. Much of it boils down to whether one takes as a target of inference the information in the mathematical object defining such effects, or the change in the world that might be brought about by acting on this information. The former objective is often encountered as the claim that the primary purpose of mediation analysis is to understand epidemiological mechanisms. 37, 47 We question this claim.
An analysis with ambiguous implications for clinical or public health action appears to have limited use from an epidemiological perspective. Rather than estimating natural effects, epidemiologists may be better off estimating controlled direct effects. 4 These effects correspond to the exposure effect that would remain after an intervention that sets the mediator to a specific level. Such effects are well suited to epidemiology conducted in the context of public health research, in that they seek to understand the change in the outcome that might be brought about by intervening on the exposure and mediator under study.
Interestingly, various attempts at clearing up the ambiguities inherent in natural direct and indirect effects have only reinforced the importance of controlled direct effects. Natural effects are often informally described by invoking metaphors of 'freezing' the mediator, 44 or 'disabling' or 'deactivating' 4 the arrow from the exposure to the mediator.
Invariably, more detail on how one might go about freezing a mediator, or disabling or de-activating an arrow, leads to the introduction of a separate variable along the exposuremediator path, whose value is set to a certain level. Whereas it might be argued that this conceptual innovation preserves the 'natural' relation between the exposure and the mediator, it does not yield a natural direct effect, but yields a controlled direct effect in which the newly introduced variable is intervened upon and set to a given level. Indeed, general conditions have been provided proving one can interpret a natural direct effect on a given DAG as a controlled direct effect in an expanded DAG in which nodes are added along the path between the exposure and mediator. 5, 43 We have discussed many issues involved in estimating natural direct and indirect effects. We have ignored, however, a number of related and important issues. In particular, the notion that causation cannot be inferred without manipulation is not without its critics. 57 Although non-manipulable exposures (such as race or sex) undoubtedly play an important role in influencing health outcomes, counterfactual theory has yet to accommodate such exposures. Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction, even though controlled direct effects are more relevant to epidemiological research, and indirect effects are of general interest in the field, there is no simple and general way to define controlled indirect effects. These limitations are currently the subject of active research. 58 Finally, our criticism of natural direct and indirect effects is possible because they are rigorously defined mathematical objects-a strength not shared by all targets of epidemiological inference. 35 Our intent was to highlight that this strength does not necessarily imbue natural direct and indirect effects with policyrelevant qualities. In epidemiology, natural direct and indirect effects are becoming effect estimates of choice in applied mediation analyses. The merits of this choice have not been reconciled with the repeated calls for a more consequential epidemiology.
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